The decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East after World War II created dozens of newly independent states, which became critical arenas for Cold War competition.
Explain one reason why newly independent states became arenas for Cold War competition after World War II.
During the 1950s, U.S. policy simultaneously supported a right-wing government and promoted democratic ideas, creating contradictory outcomes of both authoritarianism and democratic resistance.
By the end of the First World War the United States played a much larger role in world affairs than previously while an extreme hard-left socialist movement was in charge of a major power, creating preconditions that would lead to the Cold War after 1945 and the bipolar division of the world.
Faith, Liberty, and Conscription in the American Revolution
Dja Dja Wurrung Voices and the Hidden History of Australia's Gold Rushes
Caste, Labour and the Silent Rebellion of Subaltern Education
How Holocaust Trials Moved From the Margins to the Center
York's Jews and the Making of Civic Institutions in Medieval England
Holocaust Appropriation in Anti-Lockdown Protests: False Equivalence and Historical Harm
Droidean Corporeal Horror: Star Wars and the Error of Modern Mastery
Empress Deng Sui and Eastern Han Gender Norms: Rethinking Female Rule
Ten Australians Who Challenged White Australia's Racial Consensus
The Inscrutable Jailbreak of Clément Barbot: Dogs, Terror, and Memory in Hispaniola
Reconstructing Australia's Earliest Category 5 Cyclone and 1881 Storm Surge
White Collar Crime Before the Term Existed in Nineteenth Century America
Undine Spragg: The Worst Mother in American Literature?
Archaeology, Nationalism and Race: How the Past Fuels Exclusionary Politics
Wohlforth (1999) argues that the international system after the Cold War is unipolar, with the United States as the sole superpower, and that this structure is unusually stable and durable. The paper contends that the concentration of power in one state reduces the likelihood of great-power balancing and major war.
▲ The study focuses on the immediate post-Cold War period and does not account for the long-term effects of rising powers such as China, which may challenge the durability of unipolarity.
Read the paper →Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) explain why the United States chose multilateral security arrangements in Europe but bilateral ones in Asia during the 1940s and 1950s. They argue that this difference was shaped not only by material factors like power and threat, but also by America's collective identity, which made U.S. policymakers see the United States as a natural part of Europe but not of Asia.
▲ The analysis is limited to the formative period of the Cold War (1940s–1950s) and may not fully explain the persistence or evolution of these security structures in later decades.
Read the paper →Oneal and Russett (1999) find that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations all significantly reduce the probability of militarized disputes between states, supporting Kantian liberal theory. These pacific benefits hold across a long historical period (1885–1992) and are not limited to the Cold War era.
▲ The study relies on quantitative data for dyadic state pairs, which may overlook the role of non-state actors or internal conflicts that do not involve two states directly.
Read the paper →Mastanduno (1997) examines U.S. grand strategy after the Cold War through the lens of realist theories, focusing on how the United States sought to preserve its unipolar position. The paper argues that realist perspectives help explain the strategic choices made by U.S. policymakers in the immediate post-Cold War period.
▲ The analysis is confined to the mid-1990s and does not address how U.S. grand strategy evolved in response to later events such as 9/11 or the rise of China.
Read the paper →Victor (2010) argues that the United States built a 'hub and spokes' system of bilateral alliances in East Asia, rather than a multilateral one like NATO, because of a 'powerplay' rationale. This meant the U.S. designed asymmetric alliances to maximize control over smaller allies, partly to constrain 'rogue allies'—anticommunist dictators who might start wars for domestic reasons.
▲ The study focuses primarily on U.S. motivations and planning, offering less analysis of how the perspectives of the smaller Asian allies shaped the alliance structure.
Read the paper →